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Regulating Collaborative Law

The Uniform Collaborative
Law Act Takes Shape

By Andrew Schepard and David A. Hoffman

I

n February 2011, the Uniform Law Commission
(ULC), formerly the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, will submit
an amended version of the Uniform Collaborative Law
Act (UCLA) to the American Bar Association House of
Delegates for endorsement.
Collaborative law is a valuable addition to the range
of dispute resolution options available to clients, as it
can reduce the emotional and economic costs of their
involvement with the legal system, especially in divorce
and family matters. Collaborative law is also a benefit
to lawyers: it is a satisfying addition to the practices of
many already, and promotes client satisfaction with and
respect for the legal system.
This article briefly reviews collaborative law and the
key provisions of the UCLA. It then discusses recent
amendments to the UCLA that address concerns raised
by the opposition when the Act was first considered
by the House of Delegates in February 2010. It reviews
other arguments by the opponents of the UCLA and
concludes by considering the benefits of the House of
Delegates endorsing the Act.
A Brief Introduction to Collaborative Law
Collaborative law was founded in 1990 by divorce
lawyers in Minnesota who wanted their clients to have
an alternative to the adversarial atmosphere that often
permeates settlement negotiations in the shadow of

litigation. The use of collaborative law has spread rapidly
throughout the United States and Canada and to at
least 15 countries overseas. Thousands of lawyers have
been trained in collaborative law, and many clients have
participated in it. Initial empirical evaluations of collaborative law indicate high levels of client satisfaction
and that collaborative law resolves disputes faster and
more economically and with less emotional strain than
traditional settlement negotiations.1
The goal of collaborative law is to encourage parties
and lawyers to engage in “problem-solving” rather than
“positional” negotiations. As described by Roger Fisher,
William Ury, and Bruce Patton in their famous book
Getting to Yes,2 problem-solving negotiators focus on
finding creative solutions to conflict that maximize benefits for all sides, while positional negotiators focus on
arguing for and against positions to obtain concessions.
Collaborative lawyers focus on the parties’ underlying
interests, so as to achieve “win-win,” rather than “winlose” outcomes. In the collaborative law process, the
parties and counsel agree that they will not threaten
litigation and will maintain a respectful dialogue
throughout the negotiations. The parties agree to disclose information voluntarily, without formal discovery
requests, and to correct information they supplied when
it materially changes. The parties are encouraged to participate extensively in the negotiation sessions with their
collaborative lawyers. Many models of collaborative
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law engage mental health and financial professionals in
advisory and neutral roles, e.g., divorce coach, appraiser,
and child specialist.3
Collaborative law is thus like mediation in that it
emphasizes a problem-solving, interest-based form of
negotiation. It differs from some forms of mediation
(such as divorce mediation) in that the parties are
represented at the negotiating table by lawyers. In
collaborative law, no neutral facilitates negotiations.
Collaborative law also differs from arbitration in that the
parties in collaborative law seek to negotiate a voluntary
settlement, and no third-party neutral is empowered to
impose an outcome on them.
What distinguishes collaborative law from other
systems for promoting interest-based negotiations is
its enforcement mechanism. Parties sign a written
agreement (a collaborative law participation agreement)
that each party’s collaborative lawyer represents that
party only for the purpose of negotiations and will not
represent the party in court. The parties also agree that
their lawyers will withdraw from the matter if either
party brings the case to court (other than for purposes of
filing a settlement agreement). Finally, the parties and
counsel agree they mutually have the right to terminate
collaborative law at any time.
A collaborative law participation agreement is thus a
strong and enforceable mutual commitment for problemsolving negotiations. It addresses the age-old dilemma for
negotiators of deciding whether to cooperate or compete
in a situation where each side does not know the other’s
intentions and “where the pursuit of self-interest by each
leads to a poor outcome for all” —the famous “prisoner’s
dilemma” of game theory.4 In collaborative law, as Scott
Peppet has noted,
[e]ach side knows at the start that the other has similarly tied its own hands by making litigation more
expensive, because of the cost of educating a new
lawyer about the case. By hiring two Collaborative
Law practitioners, the parties create a disincentive to
litigate the case and send a powerful signal to each
other that they truly intend to work together to resolve
their differences amicably through settlement.5

There are risks for parties who choose collaborative
law, especially of incurring the economic and emotional
cost of employing a new lawyer. But there are also
benefits for them and their children. As Ted Schneyer
noted,
it would be a mistake to focus solely on the risk that
[collaborative law] poses for clients. Other things
being equal, spouses who choose court-based divorce
presumably run the greater risk of harming themselves and their children in bitter litigation or rancorous negotiations. [Collaborative law] clients presum-

ably bind themselves by a mutual commitment to
good faith negotiations in hopes of reducing the risk
that they will cause such harm, just as Ulysses had his
crew tie him to the mast so he would not succumb to
the Sirens’ call and have his ship founder.6

The organized bar has recognized that a lawyer
who represents a client in collaborative law acts consistently with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Numerous bar association ethics committees, including
the American Bar Association’s, have concluded collaborative law is a permissible limited purpose and scope
(“unbundled”) representation.7 They have emphasized
that informed parties can decide for themselves whether
the benefits of collaborative law outweigh the risks.
Collaborative law has thus far largely been practiced by lawyers in groups that draft their own model
participation agreements, set their own membership
qualifications and can include mental health and
financial professionals. Collaborative practitioners
have established their own professional association, the
International Academy of Collaborative Professionals
(IACP), and numerous local, state, and regional organizations, which have trained tens of thousands of lawyers
and other professionals within the framework created by
the rules of professional responsibility.
Why Draft a Uniform Collaborative Law Act?
The reasons that the ULC decided to undertake the
drafting of the UCLA are the same reasons it undertakes
any project—to promote the development of uniform
law in an important and emerging area. A number
of states have enacted statutes of varying length and
complexity that recognize collaborative law,8 and a
number of courts have taken similar action through the
enactment of court rules.9 Participation agreements are
crossing state lines as the use of the collaborative process
increases.
Drafting the UCLA took three years. The Drafting
Committee included several commissioners from the
committee that drafted the Uniform Mediation Act and
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collaborative lawyers. The committee was advised by
representatives of various ABA Sections and the ABA
Commission on Domestic Violence. Many collaborative
lawyers from around the country served as observers of
the drafting process and contributed their expertise to
the final product.
The core provisions of the UCLA:
• Make participation agreements enforceable if
they meet basic requirements (e.g., are in writing,
describe a collaborative matter, and designate collaborative lawyers) (section 4);
• Create an evidentiary privilege for communications made during the collaborative law process,
similar to mediation privilege (sections 17, 18, and
19);
• Require collaborative lawyers to secure informed
consent before parties enter into a collaborative
law participation agreement (section 14); and
• State clearly that collaborative law representation
does not change the professional ethics requirements of those who practice it (section 13).
The ULC approved the UCLA for transmission to the
states in July 2009. Utah has enacted it,10 and it is under
active consideration in a number of other states including Ohio,11 Oklahoma,12 Tennessee,13 and the District of
Columbia.14
The UCLA and the ABA House of Delegates
The ULC presented the UCLA to the ABA House
of Delegates for consideration at its Midyear Meeting
in February 2010, asking it to endorse it as “an appropriate Act for states desiring to adopt the specific
substantive law suggested therein.” A number of ABA
Sections—including Dispute Resolution, Family Law,
and Individual Rights & Responsibilities—endorsed
the UCLA. So did a number of major bar associations.
The UCLA was, however, opposed by the Section of
Litigation, the Judicial Division, and the Young Lawyers’
Section.
After extensive comments and discussion, the ULC
decided to withdraw the UCLA from House of Delegates
consideration to address concerns that had been raised
at the ABA Midyear Meeting. The ULC anticipates that
the amended UCLA will be submitted for consideration
to the ABA House of Delegates at its Midyear Meeting
in February 2011.
Subsequent to the February 2010 meeting, the ULC
amended the UCLA in two ways especially responsive to
the concerns raised by its opponents:15
(1) Optional enactment by court rule—The first amendment gives states an option of adapting the provisions of the UCLA by court rule or legislation.
This amendment is responsive to ABA concerns

that the UCLA could be interpreted as regulation
of lawyers— the province of the judiciary—rather
than regulation of a dispute resolution process.16
Adoption of the UCLA by court rule would be an
appropriate option for states that agree with this
view.
(2) Optional limitation of collaborative law to divorce
and family matters—A second amendment creates
another option for enacting states to limit the
scope of the Act to divorce and family law matters. A number of comments at the ABA Midyear
Meeting suggested that the UCLA would be more
easily approved by the House of Delegates if the
collaborative law process were limited to family
and divorce matters, where it has its greatest use
and acceptance.
Responses to Arguments Against Collaborative
Law and the UCLA
Other arguments advanced against the UCLA during its
first consideration by the House of Delegates essentially
reject collaborative law as a useful addition to the dispute resolution options available to lawyers and clients.
These objections, which are discussed below, cannot be
accommodated by amending the uniform act.
For example, some opponents argued that a client
cannot give informed consent to his or her lawyer’s
disqualification by the other side in advance. If that
argument is correct, the practice of collaborative law is
unethical and those who currently practice it should be
disciplined. However, the numerous bar association ethics committees, including the ABA Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, that have
considered the subject disagree, holding that a client can
consent to participation in collaborative law. Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, clients can consent
to unbundled (limited purpose) representation and to
waive most conflicts of interest between lawyer and
client.17 There is no reason that clients cannot provide
informed consent to the disqualification provision of the
collaborative law process. The informed consent requirements in UCLA are stronger than in any other statute
affecting the practice of law.
Additionally, some opponents of collaborative law
argued that, even if there is no ethical prohibition, the
ABA should not encourage a form of practice in which a
lawyer is required to withdraw from a case just when the
client most needs the lawyer—i.e., at a point of impasse
in the negotiations. However, the UCLA does not leave
the client in the lurch—collaborative law participation
agreements and the Act require continued emergency
representation and an orderly transition of the case to
successor counsel. Moreover, in those rare cases where
collaborative negotiations reach an irresolvable impasse,
the lawyer whom the client needs most is one who
specializes in courtroom practice. Clients who enter the
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collaborative law process are advised of the risk that they
could be required to switch lawyers, and they prefer that
risk to the costs and delays associated with litigation.
Those UCLA opponents who argue that clients, unlike
their lawyers, cannot know in advance how painful that
transition may be fail to take into account the fact that
clients similarly cannot know in advance the travails
that litigation—including possible counterclaims,

In light of the aforementioned considerations, we
believe the ABA House of Delegates should endorse the
UCLA because it brings sensible regulation to collaborative law—a growing ADR option that many lawyers
are practicing already, that clients have found valuable,
that bar ethics committees have endorsed, and that bar
associations have supported. The Act provides valuable uniformity to the practice of collaborative law at a

What distinguishes collaborative law from other
systems for promoting interest-based negotiations
is its enforcement mechanism.
appeals, and unpredictable outcomes—may create. In
both litigation and collaborative law, the key to appropriate practice is educating the clients so that they can
give informed consent.
Some opponents of the UCLA also argued that
lawyers can collaborate and engage in problem-solving
negotiations without the disqualification requirement.
Of course, they can and do. Indeed, in 1846, Abraham
Lincoln, himself a great trial lawyer, advised the young
lawyers of Illinois to:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them
how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in
fees, expenses and waste of time. As a peacemaker,
the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good
man. There will still be business enough.18

Because some lawyers can and do collaborate without
a participation agreement, however, does not mean that
lawyers and clients who wish to voluntarily sign one
should not be able to do so, or should lack the useful
statutory framework that the UCLA provides. Lawyers
can collaborate without every other form of ADR too,
such as mediation, but no one argues that the statutory frameworks that govern mediation, such as the
Uniform Mediation Act and various state laws, should
be abolished.
The critical overall point is that collaborative law
is a voluntary dispute resolution option. No lawyer is
compelled to practice it, and no client is compelled to
participate in it. Indeed, the UCLA provides that no
one can be forced to participate in collaborative law
over his or her objections (section 5(b)). Collaborative
lawyers view the disqualification requirement as an
indispensible feature of this particular dispute resolution
and say it changes the nature of the negotiation process
in a positive direction.19 There is no good policy reason
they should not have that option.

time when several states have enacted laws and courts
in several states have adopted collaborative law rules,
but there is still time to create uniformity instead of a
patchwork quilt. The UCLA provides the support of a
uniform law for collaborative law’s future evolution and
development. The time has come for the ABA House
of Delegates to provide the support of the nation’s most
important lawyer organization for it too. u
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(continued from page 20)
the parties on a clear understanding of consequences:
Does the deal meet articulated needs? Is it realistic and
implementable (classic “reality testing”)? As for “insulation” against buyer’s remorse, the ethical approach is to
compliment parties for their hard work and acknowledge the difficulties they confronted and overcame.
So, what’s the bottom line? Well, to quote democratic politician Helen Gahagan Douglas from the 1950
U.S. Senate race in California, don’t be a “tricky Dick”
(a reference to her then-adversary Richard Nixon’s
exploitation of her alleged left-wing sympathies). The
next time you decide to offer warm coffee instead of
ice water, be careful that your goal is in sync with the
parties’ aspirations, comports with your own integrity,
and does not unfairly impact any party. Err on the side
of transparency and be skeptical of any “covert” move
that if examined postmediation would lead a party to
conclude that you were a trickster, rather than someone
who helped them make wise decisions. u
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